Das ist kompletter Blödsinn.Zitat von carlson.vom.dach
Das ist das beste, was ich finden konnte (zugegeben, nicht alles perfekt, aber es gibt das Bild wieder):
"Oddly enough, Bartov has already mentioned the fact that German soldiers advancing into Russia - even motorized GD - did so mainly by foot"
"What Germany lacked, once it had proven the concept was a sufficient industrial base to properly motorize its entire army. Thus, pictures of the initial invasion of Russia show a remarkable lack of motorization. This factor was particularly crucial in the Russian campaign."
He's right on this one, Mario. Most Wehrmacht forces were horse drawn in 1939-1941 or travelled on foot. They were *never* fully motorized, even at the end of the war. German propaganda films *never* showed the hose and
//
Actually, if you rated all the major European powers in WW2 for their armies level of motorization/mechanization, the Germans come out on the lower end. In actuality, the British army was the most motorized of all the powers (even over the US, although not by much - I do have to check myself against Joslen on this..I am doing now).
//
Most of the US documentaries give this impression also. Again, its not obvious unless you dig deep into various texts or other sources. I think one author labeled the German army as the master of "HorseKreig".
[Links nur für registrierte Nutzer]
Public opinion to the contrary, so great was the dependence of the Nazi Blitzkrieg upon the horse that the numerical strength of German Army horses maintained during the entire war period averaged around 1,100,000. Of the 322 German Army and ZZ divisions extant in November 1943, only 52 were armored or motorized. Of the November 1944 total of 264 combat divisions, only 42 were armored or motorized. The great bulk of the German combat strength—the old-type infantry divisions—marched into battle on foot, with their weapons and supply trains propelled almost entirely by four-legged horsepower. The light and mountain divisions had an even greater proportion of animals, and the cavalry divisions were naturally mainly dependent on the horse.
"The old-type German infantry division had approximately 5,300 horses, 1,100 horse-drawn vehicles, 950 motor vehicles, and 430 motorcycles. In 1943, due to the great difficulties in supply and upkeep of motor vehicles in the wide stretches of the Eastern Front, the allotment to divisions in that theater was reduced to approximately 400 motor vehicles and 400 motorcycles, and the number of horses was increased to some 6,300. The 1944-type divisions had about 4,600 horses, 1,400 horse-drawn vehicles, 600 motor vehicles, and 150 motorcycles.
The only fully motorized unit in the old-type infantry division was the antitank battalion. Most of the divisional supply trains were horse drawn, motor vehicles being used chiefly to transport fuel and for the workshop company. A far greater degree of motorization existed among German GHQ troops, the supply units of which were mostly motorized. Motorization of GHQ troops was to a large degree a necessity, since these units included such types of outfits as heavy artillery, for which horse draft would have been a practical impossibility. These motorized GHQ units were assigned to armies, corps, and divisions as originally required. "
It is clear that the bulk of the German Army would have continued to be horse drawn unless much more bountiful sources of liquid fuel had become available than the Germans expected, even with full control of the Caucasus oil fields. Automotive production capacity would also have affected the degree of German motorization, even without the impact of war to complicate the procurement picture. Certainly, in an economy like the German, provision of motor vehicles on a U.S. scale was impossible. Extensive mass production of vehicles—with its corollary rapid quantity production at low unit cost—did not exist in Germany to the extent common in the United States.
[Links nur für registrierte Nutzer]
THE FULL MOTORIZATION ISSUE
Of the 150 or so German divisions initially involved in the start of Barbarossa, only about 36 were mechanized (panzer or motorized) which was only approximately 24% of their total forces; everyone else was basically on foot. For that matter, so were the Soviets. The main reason the Germans could not fully motorize more of their divisions is that they just didn't have the economic base, for it to have really been possible. Full or increased motorization, would have meant stripping industrial and civilian vehicles from Germany and its occupied territories, which would have adversely effected their economy. Also, petroleum supplies were another thing to consider since it was always in short supply, and was the reason why many of Hitler's well-known decisions for campaigns were made. Further, there was the maintenance and spares situation: full or increased motorization would have required training more motor mechanics and stocking more replacement parts for many more thousands of trucks. Increased or full motorization would have increased the German army's mobility and increased efficiency in delivering supplies to the front more so than horse drawn types, but it at the same time would have adversely effected petroleum expenditures.
After the successful conclusion of the France 1940 campaign, the German General Staff did draw up plans to completely motorize the entire army, but that would have meant reducing the size of the army to no more than 70 or so divisions. But the German Army was in some ways still thinking in terms of World War One, and mobile warfare doctrine was still relatively new and, until 1939-40, untested in combat. When looking at the size of the front in the Soviet Union and realizing it was going to require more combat power and troops to cover its length, in the end the regular infantry divisions were retained. As it was, to equip the 18 new panzer and motorized divisions formed after the fall of France, the infantry divisions lost many of the few motor vehicles they had, which were being replaced with more horsedrawn vehicles. Thus, the infantry division of 1941 was even less mobile than it had been in France a year earlier. Also, most of the artillery was towed by horses, not trucks or halftracks.
[Links nur für registrierte Nutzer]
Auf Deutsch ist die Quellenlage leider dürftiger:
"Ich habe die Treue, Einsatzbereitschaft und Genügsamkeit unserer Pferde im Krieg als unentbehrliche Helfer miterlebt, hatte ich doch als Komp.Chef einer bespannten ID als Soll-Bestand über 65 Pferde im Dienst. Alle Tiere sind entkräftet oder erschossen umgekommen. Es war grausam und traurig! Untenstehender Artikel ist mir aus dem Herzen geschrieben.
Ferdinand Schröder, München
Was nur noch die Alten wissen, muss hier einmal gesagt sein. Eine MGK, wie wir, die 8. Komp. des IR 170, war bespannt. Die Kompanie hatte so etwa 120 Pferde, wir aber marschierten zu Fuß. Ich selbst war Granatwerferführer und jeder Granatwerfer wurde von einem Zugpferd mit einachsigem Karren gezogen. Dazu kamen drei Munitionswagen mit je 2 Zugpferden. Der Zugführer, sein Vertreter und die drei Gruppenführer hatten je ein Reitpferd.
Mein erster und letzter Ritt war seinerzeit nach dem Balkanfeldzug in Belgrad. Diese Pferde marschierten mit uns durch Polen, Luxemburg, Belgien, Frankreich, Rumänien, Bulgarien, Jugoslawien, Griechenland, Ukraine bis in den Kaukasus und wieder zurück. Die Kilometerzahl möge jeder selbst ausrechnen."
Fakt ist: Die Wehrmacht ging zu 90% zu Fuß bzw. ließ ihr Gerät von Pferden ziehen. Ganz schlimm wurde es gegen Kriegsende, als der Sprit ausging. Auch das gilt es für realistische Szenarien zu beachten.
Die Westalliierten dagegen waren ab 1943 wirklich voll motorisiert.
Grundsätzlich:
Die Wehrmacht war keine HiTech-Army!
"In Wahrheit taten jedoch nur 850.000 Männer im Westen Dienst. Den meisten Infanteriedivisionen mangelte es an motorisierten Transportmitteln, so dass sie nicht mehr als unbewegliche, so genannte bodenständige Divisionen waren"
[Links nur für registrierte Nutzer]
"Der militärische Wert von Panzerdivisionen zeigte sich im Zweiten Weltkrieg besonders dort, wo Verbände in der Tiefe operieren oder weit umfassende Flankenangriffe durchführen konnten. Hier zeigte sich die Überlegenheit starker, vollmotorisierter und gepanzerter Verbände gegenüber der Infanterie, die bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bei im allgemeinen nachlassender Motorisierung der Armeen immer noch weitestgehend auf ihre eigenen Füße angewiesen war. Der Militärhistoriker van Crefeld spricht sogar von einer "Entmotorisierung" der Wehrmacht."
[Links nur für registrierte Nutzer]
"Eigentlich war die deutsche Wehrmacht keine motorisierte Armee, obwohl sie in Filmen und Erzählungen gerne als solche dargestellt wird. Nur 17 der insgesamt 162 deutschen und rumänischen Divisionen die 1941 an der Invasion der Sovietunion teilnahmen waren Panzerdivisionen. Wie im 1. Weltkrieg ging die Infanterie zu Fuss, Artillerie wurde von Pferden gezogen und die Versorgung erfolgte mit der Bahn. Den nicht motorisierten Verbänden fehlte die operative Beweglichkeit, sie waren auf Bahnverbindungen angewiesen und konnten sich nicht weit von diesen entfernen. Daher ist es erklärlich, dass wenige Panzerdivisionen den Begriff des Blitzkrieges prägen konnten, sie lösten sich einfach von den sonst üblichen Marschrouten, durchbrachen oder überflügelten die Linien des Gegners und schnitten seine Versorgungswege weit hinter der Front ab."
[Links nur für registrierte Nutzer]
Mit Zitat antworten
